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Abstrat: We study power ontrol in optimization and game frameworks. In the opti-
mization framework there is a single deision maker who assigns network resoures and in
the game framework users share the network resoures aording to Nash equilibrium. The
solution of these problems is based on so-alled water-lling tehnique, whih in turn uses
bisetion method for solution of non-linear equations for Lagrange multiplies. Here we pro-
vide a losed form solution to the water-lling problem, whih allows us to solve it in a nite
number of operations. Also, we produe a losed form solution for the Nash equilibrium in
symmetri Gaussian interferene game with an arbitrary number of users. Even though the
game is symmetri, there is an intrinsi hierarhial struture indued by the quantity of the
resoures available to the users. We use this hierarhial struture to perform a suessive
redution of the game. In addition, to its mathematial beauty, the expliit solution allows
one to study limiting ases when the rosstalk oeient is either small or large. We provide
an alternative simple proof of the onvergene of the Iterative Water Filling Algorithm. Fur-
thermore, it turns out that the onvergene of Iterative Water Filling Algorithm slows down
when the rosstalk oeient is large. Using the losed form solution, we an avoid this
problem. Finally, we ompare the non-ooperative approah with the ooperative approah
and show that the non-ooperative approah results in a more fair resoure distribution.
Key-words: wireless networks, power ontrol, symmetri water-lling game, Nash equi-
librium, prie of anarhy
This work was supported by BioNets European projet and by joint RFBR and NNSF Grant no.06-01-
39005.
∗
INRIA Sophia Antipolis, Altmansophia.inria.fr
†
INRIA Sophia Antipolis, K.Avrahenkovsophia.inria.fr
‡
St.Petersburg State University, agarnaevrambler.ru
Solution analytique des jeux de water-lling symétriques
Résumé : Nous étudions le ontrle de puissane dans le adre de l'optimisation et dans
elui de la théorie des jeux. Dans le premier, il y a un seul agent qui assigne les ressoures
du réseau tandis que dans le deuxième, les utilisateurs se partagent les ressoures du réseau
selon l'équilibre de Nash. La solution de es problèmes est basée sur la méthode du water-
lling. On alule des multipliateurs de Lagrange en utilisant une méthode de bisetion
pour resoudre des équations non linéaires. Nous fournissons ii une solution analytique au
problème du water-lling, qui nous permet de le résoudre en un nombre ni d'opérations.
En outre, nous produisons une solution analytique de l'équilibre de Nash dans le adre
de la théorie des jeux. Nous étudions un jeu symétrique en terme d'interférene ave un
nombre arbitraire d'utilisateurs. Quoique le jeu soit symétrique, il y a une struture hiérar-
hique induite par la quantité des ressoures disponibles pour les utilisateurs. Nous utilisons
ette struture pour eetuer une rédution suessive du jeu. En plus de son éléguene
mathématique, la solution analytique permet d'étudier des as limites quand le oeient
d'interférene est petit ou grand. Nous fournissons une preuve simple de la onvergene
de l'algorithme itératif de water-lling (l'algorithme de meilleur réponse). Il s'avère que
la onvergene de l'agorithme est ralentie quand le oeient d'interférene est prohe de
l'unité. En utilisant la solution analytique, nous pouvons éviter e problème. Aussi, nous
omparons l'approhe non oopérative à l'approhe oopérative et montrons que l'approhe
non oopérative fournit une distribution des ressoures plus équitable.
Mots-lés : réseaux sans ls, ontrle de puissane, jeu water-lling symétrique, équilibre
de Nash, oût de l'anarhie
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1 Introdution
In wireless networks and DSL aess networks the total available power for signal transmis-
sion has to be distributed among several resoures. In the ontext of wireless networks, the
resoures may orrespond to frequeny bands (e.g. as in OFDM), or they may orrespond
to apaity available at dierent time slots. In the ontext of DSL aess networks, the
resoures orrespond to available frequeny tones. This spetrum of problems an be on-
sidered in either optimization senario or game senario. The optimization senario leads
to Water Filling Optimization Problem [3, 6, 14℄ and the game senario leads to Water
Filling Game or Gaussian Interferene Game [8, 11, 12, 15℄. In the optimization senario,
one needs to maximize a onave funtion (Shannon apaity) subjet to power onstraints.
The Lagrange multiplier orresponding to the power onstraint is determined by a non-linear
equation. In the previous works [3, 6, 14℄, it was suggested to nd the Lagrange multiplier
by means of a bisetion algorithm, where omes the name Water Filling Problem. Here
we show that the Lagrange multiplier and hene the optimal solution of the water lling
problem an be found in expliit form with a nite number of operations. In the multiuser
ontext, one an view the problem in either ooperative or non-ooperative setting. If a
entralized ontroller wants to maximize the sum of all users' rates, the ontroller will fae
a non-onvex optimization problem with many loal maxima [13℄. On the other hand, in
the non-ooperative setting, the power alloation problem beomes a game problem where
eah user pereives the signals of the other users as interferene and maximizes a onave
funtion of the noise to interferene ratio. A natural approah in the non-ooperative set-
ting is the appliation of the Iterative Water Filling Algorithm (IWFA) [16℄. Reently, the
authors of [10℄ proved the onvergene of IWFA under fairly general onditions. In the
present work we study the ase of symmetri water lling game. There is an intrinsi hier-
arhial struture indued by the quantity of the resoures available to the users. We use
this hierarhial struture to perform a suessive redution of the game, whih allows us to
nd Nash equilibrium in expliit form. In addition, to its mathematial beauty, the expliit
solution allows one to nd the Nash equilibrium in water lling game in a nite number
of operations and to study limiting ases when the rosstalk oeient is either small or
large. As a by-produt, we obtain an alternative simple proof of the onvergene of the
Iterative Water Filling Algorithm. Furthermore, it turns out that the onvergene of IWFA
slows down when the rosstalk oeient is large. Using the losed form solution, we an
avoid this problem. Finally, we ompare the non-ooperative approah with the oopera-
tive approah and onlude that the ost of anarhy is small in the ase of small rosstalk
oeients and that the the deentralized solution is better than the entralized one with
respet to fairness. Appliations that an mostly benet from deentralized non-ooperative
power ontrol are ad-ho and sensor networks with no predened base stations [4, 9, 7℄. An
interested reader an nd more referenes on non-ooperative power ontrol in [2, 8℄. We
would like to mention that the water lling problem and jamming games with transmission
osts have been analyzed in [1℄.
The paper is organized as follows: In Setion 2 we reall the single deision maker setup of
the water lling optimization problem and provide its expliit solution. Then in Setions 3-7
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we formulate multiuser symmetri water lling game and haraterize its Nash equilibrium,
also we give an alternative simple proof of the onvergene of the iterative water lling
algorithm and suggest the expliit form of the users' strategy in the Nash equilibrium. In
Setion 8 we onrm our nding with the help of numerial examples and ompare the
deentralized approah with the entralized one.
2 Single deision maker
First let us onsider the power alloation problem in the ase of a single deision maker. The
single deision maker (also alled user or transmitter) wants to send information using n
independent resoures so that to maximize the Shannon apaity. We further assume that
resoure i has a weight of πi.
Possible interpretations:
(i) The resoures may orrespond to apaity available at dierent time slots; we assume
that there is a varying environment whose state hanges among a nite set of states
i ∈ [1, n], aording to some ergodi stohasti proess with stationary distribution
{πi}
n
i=1. We assume that the user has perfet knowledge of the environment state at
the beginning of eah time slot.
(ii) The resoures may orrespond to frequeny bands (e.g. as in OFDM) where one should
assign dierent power levels for dierent sub-arriers [14℄. In that ase we may take
πi = 1/n for all i.
The strategy of user is T = (T1, . . . , Tn) with
∑n
i=1 πiTi = T¯ , Ti ≥ 0, πi > 0 for i ∈ [1, n]
and T¯ > 0. As the payo to user we take the Shannon apaity
v(T ) =
n∑
i=1
πi ln
(
1 + Ti/N
0
i
)
,
where N0i > 0 is the noise level in the sub-arrier i.
We would like to emphasize that this generalized desription of the water-lling problem
an be used for power alloation in time as well as power alloation in spae-frequeny.
Following the standard water-lling approah [3, 6, 14℄ we have the following result.
Theorem 1 Let Ti(ω) =
[
1/ω −N0i
]
+
for i ∈ [1, n] and HT (ω) =
∑n
i=1 πiTi(ω). Then
T (ω∗) = (T1(ω
∗), . . . , Tn(ω
∗)) is the unique optimal strategy and its payo is v(T (ω∗))
where ω∗ is the unique root of the equation
H(ω) = T¯ . (1)
In the previous studies of the water-lling problems it was suggested to use numerial
(e.g., bisetion) method to solve the equation (1). Here we propose an expliit form approah
for its solution.
INRIA
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Without loss of generality we an assume that
1/N01 ≥ 1/N
0
2 ≥ . . . ≥ 1/N
0
n. (2)
Then, sine H(·) is dereasing, we have the following result:
Theorem 2 The solution of the water-lling optimization problem is given by
T ∗i =


(
T¯ +
k∑
t=1
πt(N
0
t −N
0
i )
)/( k∑
t=1
πt
)
, i ≤ k,
0, i > k,
where k an be found from the following ondition:
ϕk < T¯ ≤ ϕk+1,
where
ϕt =
t∑
i=1
πi(N
0
t −N
0
i ) for t ∈ [1, n].
Thus, ontrary to the numerial (bisetion) approah, in order to nd an optimal resoure
alloation we need to exeute only a nite number of operations.
3 Symmetri water lling game
Let us now onsider a multi-user senario. Speially, we onsider L users who try to send
information through n resoures so that to maximize their transmission rates. The strategy
of user j is T j = (T j1 , . . . , T
j
n) subjet to
n∑
i=1
πiT
j
i = T¯
j , (3)
where T¯ j > 0 for j ∈ [1, L]. The element T ji is the power level used by transmitter j when
the environment is in state i. The payo to user j is given as follows:
vj(T 1, . . . , TL) =
n∑
i=1
πi ln
(
1 +
αjiT
j
i
N0i + gi
∑
k 6=j α
k
i T
k
i
)
,
where N0i is the noise level and gi ∈ (0, 1) and α
j
i are fading hannel gains of user j when the
environment is in state i. These payos orrespond to Shannon apaities. The onstraint
(3) orresponds to the average power onsumption onstraint. This is an instane of the
Water Filling or Gaussian Interferene Game [8, 11, 12, 15, 16℄. In the important partiular
ases of OFDM wireless network and DSL aess network, πi = 1/n, i = 1, ..., n.
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We will look for a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of this problem. The strategies T 1∗,. . . ,TL∗
onstitute a NE, if for any strategies T 1,. . . ,TL the following inequalities hold:
v1(T 1, T 2∗, . . . , TL∗) ≤ v1(T 1∗, T 2∗ . . . , TL∗),
· · ·
vL(T 1∗, . . . , T (L−1)∗, TL) ≤ vL(T 1∗, . . . , T (L−1)∗, TL∗).
For nding NE of suh game usually the following numerial algorithm is applied. First, a
strategy of L− 1 users (say, user 2,. . . , L) are xed. Then, the best reply of user 1 is found
solving the Water Filling optimization problem. Then, the best reply of user 2 on these
strategies of the users is found solving the optimization problem and so on. It is possible to
prove that under some assumption on fading hannel gains this sequene of the strategies
onverge to a NE [10℄.
In this work we restrit ourselves to the ase of symmetri game with equal rosstalk
oeients. This situation an for example orrespond to the senario when the users
are situated at about the same distane from the base station. Namely, we assume that
α1i = . . . = α
L
i and gi = g for i ∈ (0, 1). So, in our ase the payos to users are given as
follows
vj(T 1, . . . , TL) =
n∑
i=1
πi ln
(
1 +
T ji
N0i + g
∑
k 6=j T
k
i
)
,
where N0i = N
0/αi, i ∈ [1, n] and without loss of generality we an assume that the hannels
are arranged in suh a way that the inequalities (2) hold. We would like to emphasize that
the dependane of N0i on i allows us to model an environment with varying transmission
onditions.
For this problem we propose a new algorithm of nding the NE. The algorithm is based
on losed form expressions and hene it requires only a nite number of operations. Also,
explaining this algorithm we will prove that the game has the unique NE under assumption
that g ∈ (0, 1).
Sine vj is onave on T
j
, the Kuhn-Tuker Theorem implies the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (T 1∗, . . . , TL∗) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if there are non-negative ωj,
j ∈ [1, L] (Lagrange multipliers) suh that
∂
∂T ji
vj(T 1∗, . . . , TL∗) =
1
T j∗i +N
0
i + g
∑
k 6=j
T k∗i
{
= ωj for T j∗i > 0,
≤ ωj for T j∗i = 0.
(4)
It is lear that all ωj are positive.
The assumption that g < 1 is ruial for uniqueness of equilibrium as it is shown in the
following proposition.
INRIA
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Proposition 1 For g = 1 the symmetri water lling game has innite number (ontinuum)
of Nash equilibria.
Proof. Suppose that (T 1∗, . . . , TL∗) is a Nash equilibrium. Then, by Theorem 3, there
are non-negative ωj , j ∈ [1, L] suh that
1
/(
N0i +
L∑
k=1
T k∗i
){= ωj for T j∗i > 0,
≤ ωj for T j∗i = 0.
Thus, ω1 = . . . = ωL = ω. So, T 1∗i , . . . , T
L∗
i , i ∈ [1, n] have to be any non-negative suh
that
L∑
k=1
T k∗i = πi[1/ω −N
0
i ]+,
and
n∑
i=1
πiT
k∗
i = T¯
k
for k ∈ [1, L],
where ω is the unique positive root of the equation
n∑
i=1
[1/ω −N0i ]+ =
L∑
k=1
T¯ k.
It is lear that there are innite number of suh strategies. For example, if T a∗i and T
b∗
i ,
i ∈ [1, n] (a 6= b) is the one of them and T a∗k , T
b∗
k > 0 and T
a∗
k , T
b∗
m > for some k and m.
Then, it is lear that the following strategies for any small enough positive ǫ are also optimal:
T˜ a∗i =


T a∗i for i 6= k,m,
T a∗i + ǫ for i = k,
T a∗i − ǫπk/πm for i = m,
T˜ b∗i =


T b∗i for i 6= k,m,
T b∗i − ǫ for i = k,
T b∗i + ǫπk/πm for i = m.
This ompletes the proof of Proposition 1.
4 A reursive approah to the symmetri water lling
game
Let ω1,. . . , ωL be some parameters whih in the future will at as Lagrangian multiplies. Us-
ing these parameters we introdue some auxiliary notations. Assume that these parameters
RR n° 6254
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are arranged as follows (this assumption does not redue the generality of our forthoming
onlusions):
ω1 ≤ . . . ≤ ωL. (5)
Also denote
ω¯ = (ω1, . . . , ωL).
Introdue the following auxiliary sequene:
tr =
1
1− g

1 + (r − 1)g
ωr
− g
r∑
j=1
1
ωj


for r ∈ [1, L].
It is lear that by (5)
tr+1 =
1 + (r − 1)g
1− g
(
1
ωr+1
−
1
ωr
)
+ tr ≤ tr.
Thus,
tL ≤ tL−1 ≤ . . . ≤ t1,
and
1
ωr+1
−
1
ωr
=
1− g
1 + (r − 1)g
(tr+1 − tr).
(6)
Hene, for j ∈ [k + 1, L] we have:
1
ωk
−
1
ωj
=
j−1∑
r=k
1− g
1 + (r − 1)g
(tr − tr+1). (7)
Then, sequenes {ωr} and {tr} has the following reurrent relations:
1
ω1
= t1,
1
ω2
= (1− g)t2 + gt1,
1
ωr+1
=
1− g
1 + (r − 1)g
tr+1 +
r∑
j=2
(1− g)g
(1 + (j − 1)g)(1 + (j − 2)g)
tj + t1,
(8)
where r ≥ 1. If we know sequene {tr} we an restore sequene {ωr}. Thus, these two
sequenes are equivalent.
Introdue one more auxiliary sequene as follows:
τkr =
1
1− g

1 + (L− 1− r + k)g
ωk
− g
L−r+k∑
j=1
1
ωj

 ,
INRIA
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where r ∈ [k, L], k ∈ [1, L]. There is a simple relation between sequenes {ωk} and {tk} and
{τkr }:
τkL = t
k, (9)
and
τkr =
1 + (L− 1− r + k)g
1− g
(
1
ωk
−
1
ωL−r+k
)
+ tL−r+k. (10)
So, by (7), olleting terms whih depends on tk we obtain
τkr = b
k,rtk +Ak,r , (11)
where
bk,r =
1 + (L − 1− r + k)g
1 + (k − 1)g
,
and
Ak,r = g
L−r+k−1∑
j=k+1
1 + (L− 1− r + k)g
(1 + (j − 1)g)(1 + jg)
tj −
g
(1 + (L − 2− r + k)g
tL−r+k.
Thus, Ak,r depends only on {tj} with j > k.
Finally introdue the following notation:
(a) for N0i < t
L
T ki (ω¯) =
1
1 + (L− 1)g
(τkk −N
0
i ),
(b) tL+k+1−r ≤ N0i < t
L+k−r
where r ∈ [k + 1, L]
T ki (ω¯) =
1
1 + (L − 1− r + k)g
(τkr −N
0
i ),
() for tk ≤ N0i
T ki (ω¯) = 0.
For others ombinations of relations between ωj, j ∈ [1, L], T ki are dened by symmetry.
By Theorem 3 we have the following result.
Theorem 4 Eah Nash equilibrium is of the form (T 1(ω¯), . . . , TL(ω¯)).
The next lemma provides a nie relation between L and L−1 person games whih shows
that the introdution of a new user into the game leads to a bigger ompetition for the
better quality hannels meanwhile users prefer to keep the old struture of their strategies
for worse quality hannels.
RR n° 6254
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Lemma 1 Let (T 1,L(ω1, . . . , ωL), . . . , T
L,L(ω1, . . . , ωL)) given by Theorem 4 (here we added
the seond super-sript index in the notation of the strategies in order to emphasize that the
strategies depend on the number of users). Then, we have
T k,Li (ω1, . . . , ωL) =


τkk −N
0
i
1 + (L− 1)g
for N0i < t
L,
T k,L−1i (ω1, . . . , ωL−1) for t
L ≤ N0i ,
where k ∈ [1, L− 1] and
TL,Li (ω1, . . . , ωL) =


tL −N0i
1 + (L− 1)g
for N0i < t
L,
0 for tL ≤ N0i .
5 A water-lling algorithm
In this setion we desribe a version of the water-lling algorithm for nding the NE and
supply a simple proof of its onvergene based on some monotoniity properties.
Let
Hk(ω¯) =
n∑
i=1
πiT
k
i (ω¯) for k ∈ [1, L].
To nd a NE we have to nd ω¯ suh that
Hk(ω¯) = T¯ k for k ∈ [1, L]. (12)
It is lear that Hk(ω¯) has the following properties, olleted in the next Lemma, whih
follow diretly from the expliit formulas of the NE.
Lemma 2 (i) Hk(ω¯) is nonnegative and ontinuous, (ii) Hk(ω¯) is dereasing on ωk, (iii)
Hk(ω¯)→∞ for ωk → 0, (iv) Hk(ω¯) = 0 for enough big ωk, say for ωk ≥ 1/N01 , (v) H
k(ω¯)
is non-inreasing by ωj where j 6= k.
This properties give a simple proof of the onvergene of the following iterative water
lling algorithm for nding the NE.
Let ωk0 for all k ∈ [1, L] be suh that H
k(ω¯0) = 0, for example ω
k
0 = 1/N
0
1 . Let ω
k
1 = ω
k
0
for all k ∈ [2, L] and dene ω11 suh that H
1(ω¯1) = T¯
1
. Suh ω11 exists by Lemma 2(i)-(iii).
Then, by Lemma 2(i),(v) Hk(ω¯0) = 0 for k ∈ [2, L]. Let ω
k
2 = ω
k
1 for all k 6= 2 and dene ω
2
2
suh that H2(ω¯2) = T¯
2
. Then, by Lemma 2(i),(v) Hk(ω¯0) = 0 for k > 2 and H
k(ω¯0) ≤ T¯
k
for k = 1 and so on. Let ωkL = ω
k
L−1 for all k 6= L and dene ω
L
L suh that H
L(ω¯L) = T¯
L
.
Then, by Lemma 2(i),(v) Hk(ω¯L) ≤ T¯
k
for k 6= L and so on. So we have non-inreasing
positive sequene ωk. Thus, it onverges to an ω¯∗ whih produes a NE.
INRIA
Closed form solutions for symmetri water lling games 11
6 Existene and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
In this setion we will prove existene and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for L person
symmetri water-lling game. Our proof will have onstrutive harater whih allows us to
produe an eetive algorithm for nding the equilibrium strategies.
First note that there is a monotonous dependene between the resoures the users an
apply and Lagrange multipliers.
Lemma 3 Let (T 1(ω¯), . . . , TL(ω¯)) be a Nash equilibrium. If
T¯ 1 ≥ . . . ≥ T¯L (13)
then (5) holds.
Proof. The result immediately follows from the following monotoniity property implied
by expliit formulas of the Nash equilibrium, namely, if ωi < ωj then Hi(ω¯) > Hj(ω¯).
Without loss of generality we an assume that (13) holds. Thus, by Lemma 3, (5) also
holds.
Let ω¯ be the positive solution of (12). Then, by Lemma 3, the relation (5) holds. To
nd ω¯ we have to solve the system of non-linear equations (12). It is quite bulky system and
it looks hard to solve. We will not solve it diretly. What we will do we express ω1,. . .ωL
by t1, . . . , tL, substitute these expression into (12). The transformed system will have a
triangular form, namely
H˜L(tL) = T¯L,
H˜L−1(tL−1, tL) = T¯L−1,
· · ·
H˜1(t1, . . . , tL−1, tL) = T¯ 1.
(14)
The last system, beause of monotoniity properties of H˜k on tk, an be easily solved. Now
we an move on to onstrution of H˜L(tL), . . . , H˜1(t1, . . . , tL−1, tL). First we will onstrut
H˜L(tL) and nd the optimal tL. Note that,
HL(ω¯) =
∑
N0
i
<tL
πiT
L
i (ω¯) =
=
1
1 + (L− 1)g
∑
N0
i
<tL
πi(τ
L
L −N
0
i )
=
1
1 + (L− 1)g
∑
N0
i
<tL
πi(t
L −N0i ) = H˜
L(tL).
It is lear that H˜L(·) is ontinuous in (0,∞), H˜L(τ) = 0 for τ ≤ N01 , H˜
L(+∞) = +∞ and
H˜L(·) is stritly inreasing in (N01 ,∞). Then, there is the unique positive t
L
∗ suh that
H˜L(tL∗ ) = T¯
L. (15)
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Now we move on to onstrution of H˜L−1(tL−1, tL) and nding the optimal tL−1. Note that
τL−1L = t
L−1
and by (7) and (10), we have
τL−1L−1 = τ
L−1
L +
g
1− g
(
1
ωL−1
−
1
ωL
)
= tL−1 +
g
1 + (L− 2)g
(tL−1 − tL)
=
1 + (L− 1)g
1 + (L− 2)g
tL−1 −
g
1 + (L − 2)g
tL.
Thus,
HL−1(ω¯) =
∑
N0
i
<tL
πiT
L−1
i (ω¯) +
∑
tL≤N0
i
<tL−1
πiT
L−1
i (ω¯) =
=
1
1 + (L − 1)g
∑
N0
i
<tL
πi(τ
L−1
L−1 −N
0
i ) +
1
1 + (L − 2)g
∑
tL≤N0
i
<tL−1
πi(τ
L−1
L −N
0
i )
=
1
1 + (L − 1)g
∑
N0
i
<tL
πi
(1 + (L− 1)g
1 + (L− 2)g
tL−1 −
g
1 + (L− 2)g
tL −N0i
)
+
1
1 + (L− 2)g
∑
tL≤N0
i
<tL−1
πi(t
L−1 −N0i )
= H˜L−1(tL−1, tL).
It is lear that H˜L−1(·, tL∗ ) is ontinuous and inreasing in (t
L
∗ ,∞), H˜
L−1(∞, tL∗ ) = +∞ and
H˜L−1(tL∗ , t
L
∗ ) = H˜
L(tL∗ ) = T¯
L ≤ ¯TL−1. So, there is the unique positive tL−1∗ suh that
H˜L−1(tL−1∗ , t
L
∗ ) = T¯
L. (16)
Next we onstrut H˜k(tk, . . . , tL−1, tL) and nd the optimal tk where k ∈ [1, L− 2]. By (9)
and (9), we have
Hk(ω¯) =
∑
N0
i
<tL
πiT
k
i +
L∑
r=k+1
∑
tL+k+1−r≤N0
i
<tL+k−r
πiT
k
i
=
1
1 + (L− 1)g
∑
N0
i
<tL
πi(τ
k
L −N
0
i ) +
L∑
r=k+1
∑
tL+k+1−r≤N0
i
<tL+k−r
πi(τ
k
r −N
0
i )
1 + (L− 1− r + k)g
=
1
1 + (L− 1)g
∑
N0
i
<tL
πi(b
k,ktk +Ak,k −N0i )
+
L∑
r=k+1
∑
tL+k+1−r≤N0
i
<tL+k−r
πi(b
k,rtk +Ak,r −N0i )
1 + (L− 1− r + k)g
= H˜k(tk, tk+1, . . . , tL).
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It is lear that H˜k(·, tk+1∗ , . . . , t
L
∗ ) is ontinuous and inreasing in (t
k+1
∗ ,∞), H˜
k(∞, tk+1∗ , . . . , t
L
∗ ) =
+∞ and by Lemma 1 H˜k(tk+1∗ , t
k+1
∗ , . . . , t
L
∗ ) = H˜
k+1(tk+1∗ , . . . , t
L
∗ ) = T¯
k+1 ≤ T¯ k. So, there
is the unique positive tk∗ suh that
H˜k(tk∗ , t
k+1
∗ , . . . , t
L
∗ ) = T¯
k. (17)
Thus, we have proved the following result:
Lemma 4 Solution of the system (12) is equivalent to solution of the triangular system
(14). This system has the unique solution whih an be found sequentially from tL down to
t1, applying either the bisetion method or the expliit sheme suggested in Setion II. The
optimal Lagrangian multipliers an be reonstruted from {tr} by (8).
Finally we also have the following result:
Theorem 5 The symmetri water lling game has the unique Nash equilibrium (T 1(ω¯∗), . . . , T
L(ω¯∗)),
where ω¯∗ is given by Lemma 4.
Note that although the payos have symmetri form, the equilibrium strategies, beause
of triangular form of system (14), have hierarhial struture indued by dierene in power
levels available to the users. Namely, the user who has to transmit with smaller average
power onsumption, in our ase it is user L, ats rst. He assigns his optimal strategies
as if there is no other users at all but taking into aount the total number of users and
fading hannels gains. Then, the turn to at is given to user L − 1. He takes into aount
only the behavior of the user L with smaller average power onsumption than he has, the
total number of users and fading hannels gains and so on. The last user who onstruts
the equilibrium strategy is user 1 with the largest available power resoure.
7 Closed form solution for L person game
In this setion for the ase of L users we show how Theorem 5 and Lemma 4 an be used to
onstrut NE in losed form.
Assume that T¯ 1 > . . . > T¯L. We will onstrut the optimal strategies TL∗, . . . , T 1∗
sequentially.
Step for onstrution of TL∗. Sine H˜L(·) is stritly inreasing we an nd an integer
kL suh that
H˜L(N0kL) < T¯
L ≤ H˜L(N0kL+1).
or from the following equivalent onditions:
ϕLkL < T¯
L ≤ ϕLkL+1,
where
ϕLk =
1
1 + (L− 1)g
k∑
i=1
πi(N
0
k −N
0
i ),
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for k ≤ n, and ϕLn+1 =∞. Then, sine H˜
L(tL∗ ) = T¯
L
, we have that
tL∗ =
(1 + (L− 1)g)T¯L +
∑kL
i=1 πiN
0
i∑kL
i=1 πi
.
Thus, the optimal strategy of user L is given as follows
TL∗i =
{ 1
1 + (L− 1)g
(tL∗ −N
0
i ) if i ∈ [1, k
L],
0 if i ∈ [kL + 1, n].
Step for onstrution of T (L−1)∗. Sine tL−1∗ is the root of the equation H˜
L−1(·, tL∗ ) =
T¯L−1 there is kL−1 suh that kL−1 ≥ kL and N0
kL−1+1 ≥ t
L−1
∗ > N
0
kL−1
. Thus,
tL−1∗ =
(
T¯L−1 +
1
1 + (L− 2)g
kL−1∑
i=kL+1
πiN
0
i
+
1
1 + (L− 1)g
kL∑
i=1
πi(
gt∗L
1 + (L− 2)g
+N0i )
)
/( 1
1 + (L− 2)g
kL−1∑
i=1
πi
)
.
Here and bellow we assume that
∑y
x 1 = 0 for y < x. So, k
L−1 ≥ kL an be found as follows:
(i) kL−1 = kL if T¯L−1 ≤ ϕL−1
kL−1+1,
(ii) otherwise kL−1 is given by the ondition:
ϕL−1
kL−1
< T¯L−1 ≤ ϕL−1
kL−1+1
,
where
ϕL−1k =
k∑
i=kL+1
πi
1 + (L− 2)g
(N0k −N
0
i )
+
kL∑
i=1
πi
1 + (L − 1)g
×
(
1 + (L− 1)g
1 + (L− 2)g
N0k −N
0
i −
g
1 + g
tL−1∗
)
,
for k ∈ [kL−1 + 1, n] and ϕL−1n+1 =∞.
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Thus, the optimal strategy T (L−1)∗ of user L− 1 is given by
T
(L−1)∗
i =


tL−1∗
1 + (L− 2)g
−
g
1 + g
tL∗ +N
0
i
1 + (L− 1)g
, i ∈ [1, kL],
1
1 + (L− 2)g
(tL−1∗ −N
0
i ), i ∈ [k
L + 1, kL−1],
0, i ∈ [kL−1 + 1, n].
Step for onstrution of TM∗ where M < L. We have already onstruted TL∗, . . . ,
T (M+1)∗ and now we are going to onstrut TM∗. Sine tM∗ is the root of the equation
H˜M (·, tM+1∗ , . . . , t
L
∗ ) = T¯
M
there is kM suh that kM ≥ kM+1 and N0
kM+1 ≥ t
M
∗ > N
0
kM
.
Thus,
tM∗ =
(
T¯M +
1
1 + (L− 1)g
kM∑
i=1
πi(A
k,k −N0i )
+
L∑
r=M+1
kp−1∑
i=kp+1
πi(A
p,r −N0i )
1 + (L − 1− r + p)g
)
/( 1
1 + (M − 1)g
kM∑
i=1
πi
)
.
So, kM ≥ kM+1 an be found as follows:
(i) kM = kM+1 if T¯M ≤ ϕM
kM+1,
(ii) otherwise kM is given by the ondition:
ϕMkM < T¯
M ≤ ϕMkM+1
where
ϕMk =
1
1 + (L− 1)g
k∑
i=1
πi(b
k,kN0k +A
k,k −N0i )
+
L∑
r=M+1
kp−1∑
i=kp+1
πi(b
p,rN0k +A
p,r −N0i )
1 + (L− 1− r + p)g
.
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Thus, the optimal strategy of user L is given as follows
TM∗i =


τMM −N
0
i
1 + (L− 1)g
, i ∈ [1, kL],
τMr −N
0
i
1 + (L− 1− r +M)g
, i ∈ [kr + 1, kr−1],
r ∈ [M + 1, L]
0, i ∈ [kM + 1, n].
In partiular for two and three person games (L = 2 and L = 3) we have the following
results.
Theorem 6 Let T¯1 > T¯2. Then, the Nash equilibrium strategies are given by
T 1∗i =


t1∗ −
gt2∗ +N
0
i
1 + g if i ∈ [1, k
2],
t1∗ −N
0
i if i ∈ [k
2 + 1, k1],
0 if i ∈ [k1 + 1, n],
T 2∗i =
{
1
1 + g (t
2
∗ −N
0
i ) if i ∈ [1, k
2],
0 if i ∈ [k2 + 1, n],
where
(a) k2, t2∗ are given by
t2∗ =
(1 + g)T¯ 2 +
∑k2
i=1 πiN
0
i∑k2
i=1 πi
,
k2 an be found from the ondition
ϕ2k2 < T¯
2 ≤ ϕ2k2+1,
where
ϕ2k =
1
1 + g
k∑
i=1
πi(N
0
k −N
0
i ),
for k ≤ n, and ϕ2n+1 =∞,
(b) k1 and t1∗ are given by
t1∗ =
T¯ 1 +
k1∑
i=k2+1
πiN
0
i +
1
1 + g
k2∑
i=1
πi(gt
∗
2 +N
0
i )
k1∑
i=1
πi
,
k1 ≥ k2 an be found as follows:
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(i) k1 = k2 if T¯ 1 ≤ ϕ1k2+1
(ii) otherwise k1 is given by the ondition:
ϕ1k1 < T¯
1 ≤ ϕ1k1+1,
where
ϕ1k =
k∑
i=k2+1
πi(N
0
k −N
0
i )
+
1
1 + g
k2∑
i=1
πi
(
(1 + g)N0k −N
0
i − gt
2
∗
)
for k ∈ [k2 + 1, n], and ϕ
1
n+1 =∞.
Theorem 7 Let T¯1 > T¯2 > T¯3. Then, the Nash equilibrium strategies are given by
T 1∗i =


t1∗ −
gt2∗
1 + g −
gt3∗
1 + g
+N0i
1 + 2g if i ∈ [1, k
3],
t1∗ −
gt2∗ +N
0
i
1 + g if i ∈ [k
3 + 1, k2],
t1∗ −N
0
i if i ∈ [k
2 + 1, k1],
0 if i ∈ [k1 + 1, n],
T 2∗i =


t2∗
1 + g −
g
1 + g
t3∗ +N
0
i
1 + 2g if i ∈ [1, k
3],
1
1 + g (t
2
∗ −N
0
i ) if i ∈ [k
3 + 1, k2],
0 if i ∈ [k2 + 1, n],
T 3∗i =
{
1
1 + 2g (t
3
∗ −N
0
i ) if i ∈ [1, k
3],
0 if i ∈ [k3 + 1, n],
where
(a) k3, t3∗ are given by
t3∗ = ((1 + 2g)T¯
3 +
k3∑
i=1
πiN
0
i )/(
k3∑
i=1
πi),
ϕ3k3 < T¯
3 ≤ ϕ3k3+1,
and
ϕ3k =
1
1 + 2g
k∑
i=1
πi(N
0
k −N
0
i ),
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for k ≤ n, and ϕ3n+1 =∞,
(b) k2, t2∗ are given by
t2∗ =
(
T¯ 2 +
1
1 + g
k2∑
i=k3+1
πiN
0
i +
1
1 + 2g
k3∑
i=1
πi(
gt3∗
1 + g
+N0i )
)/( 1
1 + g
k2∑
i=1
πi
)
,
(i) k2 = k3 if T¯ 2 ≤ ϕ2
k3+1,
(ii) otherwise k2 is given by the ondition:
ϕ2k2 < T¯
2 ≤ ϕ2k2+1
and
ϕ2k =
k∑
i=k3+1
πi
1 + g
(N0k −N
0
i ) +
k3∑
i=1
πi
(
1
1 + g
N0k −
N0i + gt
3
∗/(1 + g)
1 + 2g
)
.
for k ∈ [k3 + 1, n] and ϕ2n+1 =∞
() k1, t1∗ are given by
t1∗ =
(
T¯ 1 +
k1∑
i=k2+1
πiN
0
i +
k2∑
i=k3+1
πi
gt2∗ +N
0
i
1 + g
+
k3∑
i=1
πi
( gt2∗
1 + g
+
gt3∗
1 + g
+N0i
1 + 2g
))/ k1∑
i=1
πi.
So, k1 ≥ k2 an be found as follows:
(i) k1 = k2 if T¯ 1 ≤ ϕ1k2+1,
(ii) otherwise k1 is given by the ondition:
ϕ1k1 < T¯
1 ≤ ϕ1k1+1
where
ϕ1k =
k∑
i=k2+1
πi(N
0
k −N
0
i ) +
k2∑
i=k3+1
πi
(
N0k −
gt2∗ +N
0
i
1 + g
)
+
k3∑
i=1
πi
(
N0k −
gt2∗
1 + g
−
gt3∗
1 + g
+N0i
1 + 2g
)
.
8 Numerial examples
Let us demonstrate the losed form approah by numerial examples. Take n = 5, N0i =
κi−1, κ = 1.7, πi = 1/5 for i ∈ [1, 5]. We onsider the ases 1, 2 and 3 users senari.
Single user senario. Let T¯ = 5. Then, by Theorem 2 as the rst step we alulate ϕt
for t ∈ [1, 5]. In our ase we get (0, 0.14, 0.616, 1.8298, 4.58108). Thus, we have k = 5 and
the optimal water-lling strategy is T ∗ = (7.771, 7.071, 5.881, 3.858, 0.419) with payo 1.11.
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Two users senario. Let also g = 0.9, T¯ 1 = 5, T¯ 2 = 1. Then, by Theorem 6 as the
rst step we alulate ϕ2t for t ∈ [1, 5]. In our ase we get (0, 0.074, 0.324, 0.963, 2.411).
Thus, k2 = 4 and t2∗ = 5.001. Then we alulate ϕ
1
t for t = 5. In our ase we get 6.994052.
Thus, k1 = 4 and t1∗ = 0.010. Therefore, we have the following equilibrium strategies
T 1∗ = (7.106, 6.737, 6.111, 5.046, 0) and T 2∗ = (2.106, 1.737, 1, 111, 0.0462, 0) with payos
0.801 and 0.116, respetively.
Three users senario. Let us introdue the third player with the average power onstraint
T¯ 3 = 0.5. Then, by Theorem 7 we an nd that T 1∗ = (6.419, 6.169, 5.744, 4.900, 1.769),
T 2∗ = (1.861, 1.611, 1.186, 0.342, 0) and T 3∗ = (1.142, 0.892, 0.467, 0, 0) are equilibrium
strategies with payos 0.728, 0.113 and 0.055, respetively.
The equilibrium strategies of all three ases are shown in Figure 1. When a new user
omes into ompetition, it leads to a bigger rivalry for using good quality hannels and it
results in the situation when bad quality hannels turn out to beome more attrative for
users than they were when there were smaller number of users.
Figure 1: Optimal strategies for 1, 2 and 3 user games
We have run IWFA, whih produed the same values for the optimal strategies and
payos. However, we have observed that the onvergene of IWFA is slow when g ≈ 1.
In Figure 2, for the two users senario, we have plotted the total error in strategies ||T 1k −
T 1∗||2 + ||T
2
k − T
2∗||2, where T
i
k are the strategies produed by IWFA on the k-th iteration
and T i∗ are the Nash equilibrium strategies. Our approah instantaneously nds the Nash
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equilibrium for all values of g. Also, it is interesting to note that by Theorems 6 and 7 the
quantity of hannels as well as the hannels themselves used by weaker user (with smaller
resoures) is independent from the behavior of the stronger user (with larger resoures). Of
ourse, eah user alloates his/her resoures among the hannels taking into aount the
opponent behavior.
In Figures 3 and 4, we ompare the non-ooperative approah with the ooperative
approah. Speially, we ompare the transmission rates and their sum under Nash equi-
librium strategies and under strategies obtained from the entralized optimization of the sum
of users' rates. The main onlusions are: the ost of anarhy is nearly zero for g ∈ [0, 1/4]
and then it grows up to 22% when g grows from 1/4 to 1; the user with more resoures
gains signiantly more from the entralized optimization. Hene, the non-ooperative ap-
proah results in a more fair resoure distribution. In Figure 4 we plot the total transmission
rate under Nash equilibrium strategies and under strategies obtained from the entralized
optimization for the ases of 2 and 3 users. As expeted the introdution of a new user
inreases the ost of anarhy. Furthermore, in the ase of the entralized optimization with
the introdution of a new user the total rate inreases, and on ontrary in the game setting
the total rate dereases.
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Figure 2: Convergene of IWFA
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Figure 4: The eet of a new user
9 Conlusion
We have onsidered power ontrol for wireless networks in optimization and game frame-
works. Closed form solutions for the water lling optimization problem and L users symmet-
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ri water lling games have been provided. Namely, now one an alulate optimal/equilibrium
strategies with a nite number of arithmeti operations. This was possible due to the intrin-
si hierarhial struture indued by the quantity of the resoures available to the users. We
have also provided a simple alternative proof of onvergene for a version of iterative water
lling algorithm. It had been known before that the iterative water lling algorithm on-
verges very slow when the rosstalk oeient is lose to one. For our losed form approah
possible proximity of the rosstalk oeient to one is not a problem. We have shown that
when the rosstalk oeient is equal to one, there is a ontinuum of Nash equilibria. Fi-
nally, we have demonstrated that the prie of anarhy is small when the rosstalk oeient
is small and that the deentralized solution is better than the entralized one with respet
to fairness.
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